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of a network entry and upgrading development strategy. Today, the glyphosate assemblage faces un-
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The ubiquity of chemicals demands new ways of thinking about human–nature assemblages. This article
develops a dialogue between agrarian political economy, critical commodity chains research, and chemical
geographies through a case study of the world’s most widely used agrochemical: glyphosate, commonly
known as Monsanto’s Roundup. In the 1980s, glyphosate triumphed as a benign biocide that promised both
safety and effectiveness. This construct made possible a capitalist agricultural assemblage characterized by
chemical pervasiveness, first as a chemical replacement for mechanical tillage and since the 1990s as the
chemical input for genetically modified seed packages. The ubiquity that characterizes the glyphosate
assemblage is also a geography of uneven development comprising shifting firm networks, policies, and trade.
Central to this assemblage since 2000, yet largely ignored, is the outsized expansion of second- and third-tier
generic pesticide producers, especially in China, for whom glyphosate is part of a network entry and
upgrading development strategy. Today, the glyphosate assemblage faces unprecedented challenges from weed
resistance and health controversies. Whether and how the herbicide assemblage restabilizes will be
determined by the complex environmental and developmental challenges of chemical agriculture and
pervasive chemicals broadly, which highlights the need for a transdisciplinary dialogue that cuts across these
domains. Key Words: assemblages, generic herbicides, health, south–south production networks, weed resistance.
[As a result of our struggle] we got just a 2,500-meter
buffer. Today, they don’t spray there but 33 percent of
the population already has cancer and 80 percent of
the children have agrochemicals in their bloodstream
… endosulfan, DDT, 2,4-D, glyphosate. My daughters
have all those agrochemicals, not just one poison but a
cocktail of poisons.
—Sofıa Gatica, Madres de Ituzaingo (interview 9
April 2018)
The plant physiologist (Dr. Douglas Baird) who
evaluated the field trials in September 1970 was so
impressed by the results that his report to management
was captioned “EUREKA.”
—Franz, Mao, and Sikorski (1997, 7)
G
lyphosate has been labeled a “once-in-a cen-
tury herbicide” (Duke and Powles 2008).
Launched in 1972 and commercialized in
1976 by Monsanto under the trade name Roundup,
the compound represented a seemingly ideal
combination of effectiveness and safety. Glyphosate
was the most efficient plant killer synthesized to
date, eliminating more plants designated as weeds
than any other herbicide discovered by modern
weed science (Zimdahl 2010). It acted systemically:
Translocated from leaf surfaces throughout the plant,
it blocked a key amino acid synthesis pathway (the
shikimate pathway) leading to plant death after sev-
eral days. Because the inhibited target enzyme
(EPSPS) and associated pathway were unique to
plants, Monsanto scientists claimed that the mole-
cule would not harm humans and other nonplant
organisms; they also claimed that glyphosate did not
bioaccumulate in mammals or persist in soil. These
claims stood in sharp contrast to the herbicides
widely used at the time, 2,4-D and paraquat, both of
which are toxic to humans and animals. Moreover,
some scientists argued that plants were unlikely to
develop resistance to glyphosate because only a small
number of single mutations furnished the trait, did
# 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed,
or built upon in any way.
Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 0(0) 2021, pp. 1–17
Initial submission, June 2020; revised submission, October 2020; final acceptance, January 2021
so only at low levels, and were not present in wild
plants (Heap and Duke 2018). “Eureka” indeed.
Armed with these assurances, glyphosate quickly
displaced other competitor compounds and rendered
weed specialists’ knowledge redundant. The eco-
nomic impact was staggering. Glyphosate became
the largest selling and most profitable herbicide ever
marketed (Zimdahl 2010). Global sales increased
more than sixteen-fold between 1980 and 2018,
accounting for almost 20 percent of the herbicide
and more than 8 percent of the entire agrochemical
market by 2018. Glyphosate sales that year were
nearly six times those of the next highest selling
herbicide (glufosinate) and exceeded the largest sell-
ing insecticide and fungicide by 3.3 and 3.8 times,
respectively (Phillips McDougall [PMD] 2019). As
we discuss in what follows, glyphosate—the material
compound and the ideational construct of a benign
biocide—formed part of—indeed, made possible—a
capitalist agricultural assemblage characterized by
chemical ubiquity. Our focus on the glyphosate
assemblage is motivated in part by the recent public
debate over the compound, which has brought this
socionatural arrangement into sharp relief as it faces
multiple stressors. Glyphosate has made headlines
since 2015, when the World Health Organization’s
(WHO) International Agency for Research on
Cancer (2017) upended the already fraught scientific
consensus on glyphosate safety and declared it to be
a “probable carcinogen.” The ruling fueled conten-
tious public and scientific debate along with con-
tinuing legal action in numerous jurisdictions over
glyphosate’s harms (Cuhra, Bøhn, and Cuhra 2016;
Myers et al. 2016; Torretta et al. 2018). The promise
of future biocide effectiveness has also collapsed:
Although glyphosate controls more weeds than any
other known herbicide, weeds have in turn devel-
oped more strategies to resist glyphosate than they
have against any other herbicide (Heap and
Duke 2018).
At the heart of both of these challenges to the
chemical’s twinned promise of safety and effective-
ness is glyphosate’s very pervasiveness, which in turn
poses key challenges to the paradigms of safety and
risk that dominate pesticide management. In less
than two decades, much of the planet has been cov-
ered with glyphosate, in a variety of glyphosate-based
herbicide formulations. In many locales, these appli-
cations have layered upon already chemical-laden
landscapes and bodies, as Sofıa Gatica, an activist
and community leader fighting pesticide fumigation in
Argentina, explained. Glyphosate articulates with
already herbicide-resistant plants, creating “symbiotic
entanglements” of multiple biocide resistances, so-
called superweeds, that have thrown into crisis modern
weed science’s signal paradigm of chemical control.
The instability of the glyphosate assemblage cen-
ters the significance of “chemical geographies” as
part of a broader material and epistemological pro-
ject to bridge dualist nature–society thinking (Barry
2017; Romero et al. 2017). Debates over neoliberal
natures and the problematic of the human–planetary
interface signaled by various “-cene” concepts
(Anthropocene, Plantationocene, etc.) draw atten-
tion to the “chemicalization of life” or life under-
stood “as the emergent property of complex flows of
chemicals with great temporal and spatial complex-
ity” (Romero et al. 2017, 167; see also Heynen et al.
2007; Bigger et al. 2018). That is, the ubiquity of
chemicals combined with newfound anxiety about
them demands new ways of thinking about human–
nature assemblages and their boundaries. Chemical
substances are not external compounds that act on
the body; rather, chemical molecules are transforma-
tive agents woven through the body–environment,
and, as such, have wide-ranging effects on environ-
mental and human health (Guthman and Mansfield
2013; Romero et al. 2017). The prominence of
glyphosate makes it central to these new chemical
geographies, which we regard as distinct material
relations that shape capitalism geopolitically and
geoeconomically.
Focusing attention on the glyphosate assemblage
itself requires a key shift in the study of pesticides.
Much of the critical social science work in this area
has been undertaken though a political ecological
lens that has focused largely on farmer decision mak-
ing in the context of global market forces and state
promotion of capital intensification (e.g., Thrupp
1990; Grossman 1998; Galt 2014; Shattuck 2019).
This research has shown that agrochemical firms and
their field agents, as well as pesticide retailers, pro-
vide the bulk of technical assistance to farmers, espe-
cially after the dismantling of state extension
programs under neoliberal structural adjustment
(Conroy, Murray, and Rosset 1996; Aga 2018). We
augment this research agenda by shifting our analyti-
cal focus from pesticides as inputs into agricultural
commodity chains toward the pesticide assemblage
itself. Our aim is not to ignore the importance of
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the seed–chemical nexus and related controversies
over genetically modified organisms (Kloppenburg
[1988] 2004; Schurman and Munro 2013) but to add
an additional, and to date underexplored, perspective
afforded through the lens of the chemical itself (see
also Shattuck forthcoming). As we demonstrate in
what follows, the upstream dynamics of glyphosate
production and trade can help to explain the logics
and impacts of “off-farm capital” (Galt 2014), part
of an industrial political ecology (e.g., Huber 2017)
that can advance a broader pesticide research agenda.
To undertake this critical commodity study of
glyphosate, we combine insights from Guthman’s
(2019) study of chemical-based agricultural assemb-
lages with related insights from geographies of mar-
ketization. Drawing from science studies and
political ecology, Guthman conceptualized biocides
as material and ideological conditions of possibility
for arrangements of firms, farms, labor, plants, soils,
pathogens, and knowledge. Guthman reminded us
that sociotechnical assemblages are always precarious
achievements involving a tremendous amount of
“stabilization work” that can only succeed temporar-
ily. Each biotechnical “repair” creates new (or exac-
erbates old) problems, which then require renewed
stabilization efforts: a version of “iatrogenic” harm
requiring repair of repair. Yet the way elements of
the assemblage co-evolve with each repair then con-
strains the possibilities for new repairs. Crucially,
because knowledge is part of these assemblages, it,
too, is constrained. Guthman (2019) aptly called
this “technologies of repair [that] create ignorance
about the problems they induce” (23). This aligns
with Callon’s (1998, 2007) notions of “framing” and
“overflow.” Framing assembles and entangles the
large number of elements and agents that comprise
commodity assemblages; for example, the elements
necessary to produce herbicides, distribute them, and
put them to use. Framing, however, is a delicate and
incomplete process that can evade control, leading
to “overflow.” This inherent instability not only
requires constant stabilization but can lead to crisis
and efforts to reframe—to contain overflow—so that
the entity in question can be stabilized again (see
also Berndt and Boeckler 2020). The phenomenal
growth of glyphosate clearly reflects this dynamic of
stabilization and destabilization. The claims to effec-
tiveness and safety that underpin glyphosate’s ubiq-
uity stabilized an herbicide assemblage that had been
destabilized by the toxicity and selectivity of older
herbicides, and it is glyphosate’s ubiquity that is now
eroding these claims. Yet how to repair the repair
is unclear.
We argue that glyphosate’s ubiquity and its emerg-
ing crises exist not only because of the transforma-
tion in agricultural practices initiated and developed
with glyphosate but also because of the myriad ways
in which off-farm production, markets, and trade of
glyphosate itself shape the wider assemblage. We
highlight the development aspirations of not only
low- and middle-income farmers in the Global
South but also agrochemical capital and the state.
That is, the chemical ubiquity that characterizes the
glyphosate assemblage is also a geography of uneven
development comprising shifting firm networks, state
policies, and changing trade relations. Our approach
highlights marketization and commodification of
glyphosate as a contradictory and always incomplete
process driven by exclusions, devaluations, and
more-than-economic logics that remake geographies
of uneven development (see Werner 2016; Berndt,
Peck, and Rantisi 2020; Berndt, Werner, and
Fernandez 2020).
In what follows, we examine glyphosate as a
socionatural assemblage understood as a (spatial)
arrangement of heterogeneous elements that entan-
gle chemical substances, production technologies,
agrochemical companies, and corporate strategies
with crops, seed science, state regulation, and agri-
cultural production methods (Guthman 2019). Our
analysis is based on secondary literature in weed sci-
ence and toxicology, official United Nations (UN)
trade statistics, and proprietary industry data and
reports (i.e., data from PMD). We map the emer-
gence of the glyphosate assemblage over its fifty-year
history, tied to changing agricultural practices, tech-
nologies, and knowledge struggles. We then discuss
glyphosate discovery, the rollout of no-till methods
in the 1980s, and the 1990s introduction of herbi-
cide tolerant genetically modified (HT-GM) seed
packages. We next analyze post-2000 patent expiry
and how the mass production of glyphosate enables
agrarian transition in the Global South and new
south–south political economic relations of pesticide
production and trade. Material overflows, interrup-
tions, emergences such as cancers and superweeds,
and knowledge struggles over these processes are
interwoven through each of these phases and have
shaped the resulting assemblage. We then cover the
material dimensions and knowledge struggles around
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weed resistance and toxicity, theorizing how key
agents work together to stabilize the global glypho-
sate assemblage at a time of crisis. In sum, we argue
that the glyphosate assemblage has provided the
conditions of possibility for the global expansion of
high-yield chemical-intensive agriculture, and it is
the current overflows and iatrogenic harms of the
assemblage that have put it into crisis. Whether this
leads to repairs that restore the assemblage or
requires broader changes in these agrochemical geog-
raphies of uneven development remains to be seen.
The Making of the Glyphosate
Assemblage: No-Till and HT-GM Seeds
Judging by sheer numbers, herbicides have been
the clear success story of the agrochemical industry
over the last half-century. The rise and availability
of glyphosate has played an outsized role in this shift
(Magin 2003; Zimdahl 2010). Globally, herbicide
use has risen rapidly, comprising 42 percent of the
global pesticide market by 2018 by value, far exceed-
ing the share of insecticides (28 percent) and fungi-
cides (27 percent; PMD 2019). The focus on
herbicides as a class, however, obscures the key
change in their use over time. Prior to the 1960s,
herbicides were selective, targeted to broadleaf, grass,
or woody species. Species selectivity did not translate
into selective use per se. Indeed, the herbicide
2,4-D, a broadleaf biocide, inaugurated the weaponi-
zation of widespread herbicide application in war,
first by the British in Malaysia and then by the
United States in Vietnam, where it was mixed with
2,4,5-T to make Agent Orange. In the 1950s the
British Imperial Chemical Industries synthesized and
commercialized paraquat (and related diquat), the
first nonselective herbicides, which shifted use from
selective application for specific weed classes to gen-
eral application for new no-till farming methods and
land use change (e.g., land restoration for pasture or
grazing; Zimdahl 2010). No-till farming allows for
seeding directly after harvest or into fallow land
without the need for plowing and harrowing. Often
called conservation tillage by proponents, this reduces
soil erosion and fuel-intensive mechanical tilling.
Experiments in no-till farming using paraquat were
underway in expansive farm systems in settler colo-
nial contexts in the 1970s, and British aid programs
liberally distributed paraquat to developing countries
to lower labor expenditure (Grossman 1998;
Wesseling, Corriols, and Bravo 2005). Broadcast
application of paraquat and diquat over large land
masses had limits due to the compounds’ acute tox-
icity and environmental fate, however. Paraquat
today remains a common pesticide used by small
farmers in the Global South, is associated with thou-
sands of deaths (mostly intentional), and has been
banned in many countries (Grossman 1998;
Wesseling et al. 2001; Wesseling, Corriols, and
Bravo 2005; Pesticide Action Network [PAN] 2020).
Glyphosate enabled expansion of no-till farming
methods. Discovered by a Swiss chemist in the
1950s, the novel compound changed hands several
times but was not commercialized until a U.S. chem-
ist at Monsanto discovered herbicide activity in var-
iants of phosphonate derivatives from glycine in
1970. After successful lab and field trials, glyphosate
was patented in 1971 and subsequently marketed by
Monsanto under the trade name Roundup. Because
of its high price, initially it was used mainly to con-
trol difficult perennial grasses (Magin 2003). As the
price declined, however, it quickly displaced para-
quat and diquat for no-till farming as the method
expanded in the 1980s in the United States and sub-
sequently in Latin America (mainly Brazil and
Argentina).1 In Brazil and Argentina, no-till farming
was one of several critical technology changes prior
to the introduction of HT-GM crops that pushed
the agricultural frontier in the cerrado savanna
region and the gran chaco ecosystem, respectively
(Martınez Dougnac 2016; Caceres 2018). In the
United States, no-till methods facilitated by glypho-
sate together with machinery improvements led to a
30 percent decline in farm energy consumption in
the 1980s and 1990s (Elmore 2018). Total global
area of applied glyphosate increased to 70 million
hectares by the mid-1990s, reflecting the expansion
of no-till methods prior to the rollout of commercial
HT-GM seeds (Woodburn 2000). Glyphosate would
soon become synonymous with HT-GM seed pack-
ages, and no-till farming remained a significant prac-
tice that would form part of both GM farm systems
and cereal and row crop farming more widely.
Glyphosate is a key element animating a wider
sociotechnical assemblage that arranges specific agri-
cultural production methods and biotechnological
knowledge. Much has been written about Monsanto
scientists’ invention of GM crops and the establish-
ment of the technological package with glyphosate,
introduced commercially in the United States and
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Argentina in 1996. Elmore (2018) argued that this
shift toward biotech on the part of Monsanto
reflected a wider crisis in a chemical industry that
had hitherto relied heavily on processing cheaply
obtained petroleum by-products. In 1980, the com-
pany’s net profits fell by half as knock-on effects of
the oil shocks led to higher priced petroleum deriva-
tive compounds and forward integration by the oil
majors seeking to profit from by-products (Elmore
2018). At the time, Monsanto was the largest and
lowest cost producer of ammonium nitrate (fertilizer),
and sold pesticides used widely in the U.S. Midwest
(DDT, 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, and parathions; Magin 2003).
The company quickly divested from its own fossil fuel
assets and production of these bulk, low-value
“commodity chemicals” as it pivoted toward biotech
development. The lead scientist of Monsanto’s new
biotech research effort told shareholders in 1982 that
new products would be “less dependent on raw mate-
rial costs” and would “have a strong proprietary char-
acter” (quoted in Elmore 2018, 162).
These efforts bore fruit by the mid-1990s, when
Monsanto introduced HT-GM seeds that were
branded as “Roundup Ready.” Introduction of these
glyphosate-tolerant soybean, maize, and cotton seeds
in the key production regions of North America (the
United States), Latin America (Brazil and
Argentina), and East Asia (China and India) under-
pinned a highly potent sociotechnological assemblage
that further spurred the dramatic growth of glyphosate
use during the 2000s (see Figure 1). An additional
effect was a further shift within the herbicide market
away from competing broad-spectrum herbicides such
as paraquat and even more so from more expensive
selective substances such as urea-based herbicides (e.g.,
diuron used mainly for cotton). In particular, the sepa-
rate and newer class of sulfonylureas that competed
directly with glyphosate in the soybean and maize sec-
tor were severely curtailed by the triumphal march of
the seed–glyphosate–no-till assemblage (Zimdahl 2010;
PMD 2019). These heightened competitive tensions
in the market forced agrochemical producers to rede-
fine their strategic position vis-a-vis Monsanto. The
replacement of numerous herbicides by glyphosate and
glyphosate’s entanglement with the lucrative GM seed
market pushed an increasing number of agrochemical
firms to shift their research and development (R&D)
budgets from herbicide discovery to transgenic and
hybrid seed trait development (Green 2018).
If Monsanto divested from many of its
“commodity herbicides” in the 1980s, glyphosate
remained its most profitable product and, in its vari-
ous chemical forms, the compound drove vertically
integrated expansion of manufacturing capacity. In
the 1990s, the production of key intermediates was
brought in-house, and the company increased extrac-
tion at its wholly owned phosphate mine in Soda
Springs, Idaho (Woodburn 2000; Elmore 2018). The
company maintained sufficient manufacturing capac-
ity to supply the world market from five plants in
the United States, Belgium, Malaysia, Brazil, and
Argentina (Woodburn 2000).2 Although Monsanto’s
installed capacity was significantly larger than com-
petitor firms, the expiry of country-specific patents,
licensing arrangements, and unlicensed generic pro-
duction was well underway by the middle of the
decade. Some thirteen manufacturers had installed
capacities of 1,000 tons per year or more in 1998,
based in Taiwan, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary,
South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.
One large facility came online in China and signifi-
cant additional production capacity was installed via
a host of small firms (some twenty to forty in China;
Woodburn 2000). The geography of glyphosate pro-
duction, use, and the politics of value would radi-
cally shift in the new millennium, though.
Agrarian Transformations, Herbicide
Production Networks, and New Uneven
Geographies of Development
Central to the most recent chapter in the glypho-
sate assemblage is dramatic expansion not only in
use but also production of herbicides in the Global
Figure 1. Total glyphosate use, 1994 through 2014. Note: GE-
HT¼ genetically engineering herbicide tolerant. Source: Adapted
from Benbrook (2016, S24).
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South and Eastern Europe. To be sure, agrochemical
intensification has long been synonymous with the
expansion of capitalist agriculture in the Global
South. It has been part and parcel of mainstream
development policy whether under state-promoted
import substitution regimes advanced through the
Green Revolution or subsequent structural adjust-
ment and the formation of retail-driven agricultural
commodity chains. In relation to this longer trajec-
tory of appropriationism via chemicals (Goodman,
Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987), today’s glyphosate trends
are marked by both global ubiquity—that is, the
unprecedented volume of herbicide use—as well as
striking new geographies of production, trade, and
consumption.
A range of studies in diverse contexts have noted
significant volume increases in herbicide use in the
new millennium: a 50 percent increase in post-
European Union (EU) enlargement member states
(Bonanno et al. 2017), 250 percent in India (since
2005; Das Gupta et al. 2017), twenty-five-fold in
China (Huang, Wang, and Xiao 2017), and twenty-
fold in Ethiopia (Tamru et al. 2017). Several factors
drive this “herbicide revolution” in middle-income
countries (Haggblade et al. 2017). In the face of ris-
ing rural labor costs and off-farm employment in the
Global South, use of inexpensive herbicides signifi-
cantly lowers demand for costly, labor-intensive
weeding (Gianessi 2013; see also Schreinemachers
and Tipraqsa 2012; Hedlund, Longo, and York
2020). Herbicide use has also accelerated in Eastern
European countries in the wake of the opening of
markets after 1989, above all in Ukraine and Russia.
This herbicide revolution has occurred even in many
countries, including China, that have approved few
HT-GM crops.3 Thus, much of the increase reflects
conventional application of glyphosate as a broad-
spectrum weed killer between cropping cycles and in
the expansion of no-till methods, and as HT-GM
technologies continue to spread, one would expect
even wider adoption (Benbrook 2016).
The observed herbicide revolution is not solely
about rapid herbicide adoption but also comprises
novel south–south and south-to-north production
networks (see also Shattuck forthcoming). These
new networks supply low-cost off-patent herbicides
at high volumes, and glyphosate is chief among
them. This fundamental reorientation of production
networks to the Global South is perhaps the biggest
surprise, given that conventional understandings in
both mainstream and critical development literatures
presume geographically stagnant North–South rela-
tions (Horner and Nadvi 2018). This shift is evident
in official trade data, which show that global herbi-
cide exports nearly quadrupled in volume from 2000
to 2017; this increase was 30 percent more than all
other pesticide exports (UN COMTRADE 2020).
“Emerging” market economies are now principal pro-
ducers and exporters of herbicides. In 2018, four of
the top ten global herbicide exporters (by volume)
were “emerging” economies: China (1), India (5),
Malaysia (7), and Ireland (10), followed by Argentina
(11), Hungary (13), Poland (14), and South Africa
(15; UN COMTRADE 2020). Among these coun-
tries, China and India stood out as significant export-
ers to both “emerging” and high-income countries for
a range of pesticides, including both technical glypho-
sate (i.e., active ingredients [AIs]) and formulated
products. Industry sources estimate that more than
2,500 pesticide manufacturers were operating in
China in 2013, producing more than 300 AIs and
3,000 formulations (Han 2014). Quite strikingly,
China accounted for 46 percent of all herbicide global
exports in 2018, whereas the United States, the sec-
ond largest exporter, accounted for just 9 percent
(UN COMTRADE 2020).
This concentration of productive capacity in
China is the outcome of a more complex story of
industry restructuring and production network rear-
rangements over the previous two decades. A turn-
ing point for expanded herbicide use was the year
2000, when Monsanto’s final patent on glyphosate
expired and generic producers expanded production
of glyphosate AI and formulated new, cheaper glyph-
osate-based herbicides (GBHs).4 As one would
expect, this had immediate downward effects on
global prices. At the same time, having adopted
measures to reduce production costs in anticipation
of generic competition, Monsanto continued to
manufacture AI and branded formulas as a
“proprietary off-patent producer.” The extent to
which prices fell can be illustrated in Argentina,
where the glyphosate patent expired early, in 1987.
Prices dropped from US$40 per liter in the early
1980s to around US$10 in the early 1990s to US$3
in 2000 (Trigo et al. 2003). Sales of glyphosate
soared as a result (Figure 2), mirroring the spectacu-
lar volume increases noted earlier, until the Great
Recession in 2008 and 2009, which started a period
of volatility in both sales and prices linked to
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variability in both crop markets and Chinese produc-
tion of technical glyphosate (Shoham 2015).
Emerging at that time, too, were new challenges to
the safety-effectiveness promise of the benign bio-
cide, to which we return in the next section.
Glyphosate’s transformation from a patent-pro-
tected product into a “market commodity” necessi-
tated a profound rearticulation of global networks of
production, distribution, and use. The availability of
cheaper products led to increasing demand in more
price-sensitive “emerging” markets where generics
account for a growing proportion of overall pesticide
consumption. This provided a window of opportu-
nity for second- and third-tier companies, either sell-
ing directly into these markets or profiting from
cost-cutting strategies of former patent-holding first-
tier firms (e.g., outsourcing, licensing, divesting;
Skernivitz 2019). Firms from China and, to a lesser
extent, India have played a dominant—and chang-
ing—role in this shifting organizational and spatial
division of labor.
Initially, production capacities in China and other
“emerging” countries were used to acquire technical
AI and intermediate products at lower prices in cap-
tive supplier relations, termed “toll manufacturing”
in the industry. Some of the larger generic compa-
nies such as U.S.-based Arysta LifeScience (now
owned by Indian company UPL) and the Israeli
generics firm Makhteshim Agan Industries (acquired
by ChemChina and rebranded as Adama) adopted
this asset-light approach to outsourcing production
to smaller companies in China (and later also in
India). Chinese exports were thus dominated by the
less profitable “raw material” in agrochemical supply
chains, almost exclusively consisting of generic AIs.
Coinciding with the expiration of Monsanto’s patent
for glyphosate, the Chinese national government
facilitated this development with a discriminatory
export tax rebate program on key pesticide products
to give producers a favorable position in the global
market. “Pure” AIs received higher rebates than for-
mulations, providing importing international compa-
nies with inexpensive material that could be
reprocessed into higher value formulations and
exported with a considerable profit margin. Together
with low-wage labor, ready availability of capital,
and relatively lax environmental standards, this
quickly positioned China’s pesticide industry as the
key supplier of off-patent herbicide AIs globally
(ChinaAg 2018).
After Chinese companies had become indispens-
able suppliers of low-value “commodity chemicals,”
the Chinese state switched tactics and embarked on
a strategy of upgrading in the early 2010s. The strat-
egy coincided with global overproduction and a price
slump for glyphosate after the financial crisis and
Figure 2. Global glyphosate sales, 1980 through 2018. Source: Adapted from data provided in communication with Phillips McDougall.
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dovetailed with China’s “going out” strategy,
wherein upgrading of domestic production capacity
was coupled with significant outward foreign direct
investment (McMichael 2020). The Chinese govern-
ment sought a considerable reduction in the number
of agrochemical firms and consolidation of a small
number of internationally competitive pesticide com-
panies or, better, large conglomerates. State-led
restructuring connected with three key upgrading
objectives that were at least partially achieved: (1)
increasing exports of finished, formulated products
vis-a-vis AIs; (2) targeting high-end users in the EU
and North America; and (3) building up brands and
shifting away from mere quantity-oriented exports
(Han 2014). Connected with these shifts, the state
introduced tighter environmental regulations that
led to a crackdown on smaller manufacturers, clo-
sures, and forced mergers and relocations. Taken
together, these practices reduced Chinese glyphosate
AI production capacity from around 940,000 tons in
2014 to about 725,000 tons in 2018, slowing glypho-
sate export growth and raising prices globally. To
put Chinese glyphosate capacity in perspective, in
2016 China was still estimated to account for
roughly 70 percent of global glyphosate production
(ChinaAg 2018; PMD 2019; Rana 2020).
China’s pesticide sector restructuring also sparked
global reorganization of the industry. Overall price
fluctuations, generic competition, and the ups and
downs in key agricultural commodity markets led to a
flurry of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the
agrochemical industry. By 2015, the number of first-
tier firms was down to six; since then, further M&As
reduced that number to only four global firms:
Syngenta Group (dominated by ChemChina), Bayer-
Monsanto, Corteva Agriscience (merger between
Dow and DuPont), and BASF. The takeover of
Syngenta by ChemChina was the largest merger in
Chinese history. On the heels of these widely
reported M&As, a group of second-tier companies
consolidated, including Sumitomo Chemical (Japan),
Nufarm (Australia), FMC Corporation (United
States), United Phosphorous Limited (India), and
several Chinese companies including Nutrichem, Red
Sun, Shandong Weifang Rainbow, and Yangnong. A
larger number of specialized companies comprise a
third tier, including firms in a continuously evolving
landscape of technical-grade producers and formula-
tors in China, India, and other “emerging” econo-
mies. These firms include Huapont Life Sciences,
Fuhua Tongda, Jiangsu Huifeng, Sichuan Leshan
Fuhua, Wynca, Lier, and Kumiai Chemical (ChinaAg
2018; PMD 2019; see Figure 3). Herbicides, mainly
glyphosate, play the most significant role in the port-
folios of these third-tier Chinese companies.
These M&As and accompanying disinvestments
resulted in shifts in supply chains that remake geog-
raphies of uneven development. The strategic
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the generic herbicide production network. Note: Includes ChemChina, Sinochem, Adama.
Dow/DuPont. Agrochemical firms’ relation to resource extraction requires further research. On Bayer-Monsanto ownership of an
elemental phosphate mine, see Elmore (2018).
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repositioning of the sector in China already discussed
provided an opportunity for Indian companies to
occupy the lower tiers of the network. Indian agro-
chemical production subsequently rose by 64 percent
from 2007 to 2017 (Shan 2019). In addition to UPL,
smaller players such as Coromandel, Punjab
Chemicals, and Indogulf positioned themselves to
benefit by taking on production in the wake of rising
production costs, tighter regulations, and state-driven
consolidation in China. As a result, Indian producers
increased their exports to other Asian markets, Latin
America, and Africa, by nearly threefold between
2012 and 2017 (UN COMTRADE 2020). Apart
from being one of the fastest growing agrochemical
markets itself, Indian producers are used by Chinese
companies as alternate sources of technical and inter-
mediate products and collaborate in the development
of new products and formulations (PMD 2012; Shan
2019). Thus, a complex pattern has emerged globally
where products (AI and formulations) shifted between
firms at different tiers regionally, involving divest-
ments and acquisitions as well as cooperative licens-
ing, cascading outsourcing agreements, and the
indirect and direct control of marketing channels in
key regions such as Latin America.
Our analysis of industry and trade reports points
to three key trends in the recent development of the
herbicide production network. First, AI production
activities have largely shifted toward the Global
South, with China being the key destination and
India playing an increasingly prominent role. This
has been accompanied by a flurry of transactions in
which established companies sell older substances to
smaller generic firms that have a larger production
presence in these countries. In these transactions,
substances change hands repeatedly, including many
identified as highly hazardous by institutions such as
the PAN.5 These divestments normally include
registrations, manufacturing information, and intel-
lectual property rights (Euromonitor International
2016; PMD 2019). Second, the upgrading process
undertaken by Chinese capital led to specialization
in more advanced AI production and formulation
and acquisition of knowledge via investment in key
global generic companies. Moves such as
ChemChina’s acquisition of Makhteshim (now
Adama) were paralleled by other companies such as
Japan’s Sumitomo acquisition of a majority share in
the Indian company Excel Crop Care and the
Indian company UPL’s purchase of Arysta Life
Science in the United States. These M&As regularly
involved a shift of production “southward.” In the
case of Adama, for example, Chinese facilities
became the center hub for AI manufacture and for-
mulation following the company’s takeover by
ChemChina (PMD 2019). Third, although R&D-
driven companies account for a majority share of the
agrochemical market (59 percent), they compete
directly with generic firms as the proportion of off-
patent AIs now far exceeds those under patent due
to the paralysis in new discoveries (PMD 2019).
Viewed through this lens, the glyphosate assemblage
is sustained organizationally by a host of networked
second- and third-tier firms that have relied on the
production of AI and, increasingly, GBH formula-
tions to enter a rapidly expanding generics market.
The assemblage furnishes the material conditions
(low cost, abundant supply) for agrarian change, as
glyphosate enables labor replacement in the Global
South and Eastern Europe, in turn producing a
global geography of chemical ubiquity.
Chemical Geographies and
Nature’s Liveliness
Throughout its breathtaking history, glyphosate’s
success as a broad-based herbicide rested on the
promise of ever-increasing efficiency and productiv-
ity with little or no risk. Paradoxically, glyphosate’s
popularity was due to both its ability to kill multiple
types of weeds and its purported safety for human
and nonhuman organisms as well as the environ-
ment generally. Proponents declared that as part of
no-till systems and when packaged with GM seeds,
glyphosate was better for the soil and was more effi-
cient because farmers could now spray during the
growing season, killing everything but the desired
crop. Efficiency, in turn, seemed to enhance safety,
because selective herbicides and more toxic nonse-
lective compounds could be substituted by this sin-
gle, apparently benign, biocide (Cuhra, Bøhn, and
Cuhra 2016). The construction of a benign biocide
combined with its low cost led to the expansion of
uses of GBHs: for desiccation as a “harvest aid” on
cereal crops, sugarcane, and legumes; to clear land
between trees in orchards; to clear waterways of
invasive plant species; to remove nonwoody brush
from roadsides and railways; and to control weeds in
urban settings like parks and schools (Cuhra, Bøhn,
and Cuhra 2016; Van Bruggen et al. 2018).
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Although dissident scientists long challenged these
claims and the chemical’s pervasive use that they
supported, only in the last decade have we seen the
erosion of the dual promise of glyphosate’s efficiency
and safety. Drawing on the emerging attention to
chemical geographies, we extend that lens to encom-
pass the materiality of glyphosate itself, addressing
how it acts on plants’ evolutionary ability to develop
resistance and how exposure affects human health,
including its links to cancer and endocrine disrup-
tion. The instability of the glyphosate assemblage
from these overflows and iatrogenic harms illustrates
the ways in which the dual promise of efficiency and
safety is yielding a dual crisis of weed resistance and
health problems; that is, it illustrates the limits of
repair, as new problems emerge as an effect of inter-
actions within the assemblage.
Weed Resistance
As biocides, herbicides appropriate not only mate-
rial resources and energy needed for production but
also pest plants’ biological susceptibility to these
chemicals (Jørgensen et al. 2018). In turn, however,
plants evolve under the selective pressure of these
herbicides, yielding herbicide resistance. This erosion
of susceptibility then spurs the well-documented
“pesticide treadmill,” as new-generation biocides
replace older compounds that have lost their effective-
ness (Zimdahl 2010; Swinton and Van Deynze 2017;
Green 2018; Heap and Duke 2018). Glyphosate itself
is a result of this process, in which the iatrogenic
problems of one repair require further repair while also
locking in the chemical paradigm. When Monsanto
introduced glyphosate in 1972, it replaced both nonse-
lective herbicides and several selective herbicides that
suffered from declining effectiveness due to widespread
weed resistance. Today, however, weed scientists
lament that no new modes of action have been com-
mercialized in thirty years (Heap and Duke 2018). As
Table 1 shows, only three of the top fifteen herbicides
in 2018 were developed after 1990; the two developed
in the 2000s are for selective herbicides, and the num-
ber four herbicide is 2,4-D, an agrochemical mainstay
since the 1940s. Meanwhile, the herbicide resistance
cycle, or the time in which weed resistance signifi-
cantly undercuts herbicide effectivity, has decreased.
Some experts speculate that this “biological” turnover
time for weed resistance stands at only six to seven
years (Green 2018).
Weed science optimists predicted that glyphosate
would not provoke significant development of weed
resistance because, unlike most other herbicide
modes of action, resistance did not occur in wild
plant populations (Heap and Duke 2018). Moreover,
glyphosate resistance appeared to be difficult to
acquire through known pathways. Whereas in some
herbicides, a mutation in just one base pair can con-
fer upwards of tenfold resistance and many single
base pair mutations can lead to this result, in glyph-
osate very few single base pair mutations lead to any
significant level of resistance (Heap and Duke
2018). This optimism soon faded. Indeed, the same
year that Monsanto introduced Roundup Ready soy-
beans in the United States and Argentina (1996),
the first case of evolved glyphosate resistance was
recorded in Australia in the grass Lolium rigidum,
found in an apple orchard that had been treated
with a GBH multiple times per year for fifteen years.
From a weed science perspective, the introduction of
HT-GM crops created the perfect conditions for
weed resistance because selection took place over
greater land areas and for longer periods of time
than any other herbicide class (Heap and Duke
2018). To date, weed scientists have reported forty-
eight glyphosate-resistant plant species, including
species that are resistant to glyphosate alone and
those that possess resistance traits for multiple herbi-
cides, in twenty-seven countries (Heap 2020).
The scope of weed resistance mechanisms is also
significant. If single base pair mutations lend low










1 Glyphosate 5,325 1972 Bayer
2 Glufosinate 916 1986 BASF
3 Mesotrione 780 2001 Syngenta
4 2,4-D 748 1945 Nufarm
5 Atrazine 655 1957 Syngenta
6 Metochlor 645 1975 Syngenta
7 Paraquat 585 1962 Syngenta
8 Acetochlor 475 1985 Bayer
9 Pinoxaden 435 2006 Syngenta
10 Pendimethalin 405 1976 BASF
11 Dicamba 388 1965 BASF
12 Flumioxazin 380 1993 Sumitomo
13 Clomazone 365 1986 FMC
14 Picloram 310 1963 Dow
15 Clethodim 309 1987 Sumitomo
Note: Adapted from Phillips McDougall (2019).
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levels of resistance to glyphosate, double base pair
alterations are far more effective. These and other
genetic changes (i.e., codon deletion and gene
amplification) lead to resistance at the target site,
rendering the target enzyme (EPSPS) resistant to
glyphosate. Because glyphosate was developed for
commercial use in HT-GM crops, Monsanto scien-
tists argued that double mutations could not be
transferred from cultivated GM crops to wild plants
because the mutations would have to be developed
simultaneously (Green 2018; Heap and Duke 2018).
They were wrong. Weeds did develop double muta-
tions but did so in sequence: The low level of resis-
tance conferred by a single genotypic change
allowed enough plants to survive and later to
develop the second mutation. The adoption of mul-
tiple resistance traits is called creeping resistance and
stems from the application of low doses of glypho-
sate. The progeny of plants with low-level resistance
combine traits, leading to the building up of higher
levels of resistance. The solution has been to apply
higher doses of glyphosate to maximize the kill rate.
This strategy has failed with several grasses, which
account for nearly half of all glyphosate-resistant
weeds, where high-dose applications coexist with
high weed resistance rates (Heap and Duke 2018).
Plants have also developed unique nontarget site
forms of glyphosate resistance to inhibit the com-
pound’s translocation from sprayed leaves to meris-
tems. Scientists are just beginning to study the
mechanisms weeds have developed that limit the
translocation of the compound, including changing
the leaf shape to absorb less herbicide spray and
sequestering the compound in epidermal tissue to
prevent or minimize translocation. Plants also have
developed a form of resistance that weed scientists
call the Phoenix phenomenon. Observed in
Ambrosia trifida, the giant ragweed, the leaves of the
plant die within hours of treatment rather than the
normal systemic effect, which usually takes days.
Because the compound is trapped in the dead leaves,
the plant subsequently regrows, rising from the bio-
cidal ashes (Heap and Duke 2018).
The failures of weed scientists and agrochemical
researchers to predict and solve the problem of resis-
tance illustrate Guthman’s (2019) points about
knowledge as part of the agrochemical assemblage.
Not only is knowledge constrained by the assemblage
but rising weed resistance has already had an enor-
mous impact on the herbicide commodity network.
Bayer (Monsanto) and Corteva AgriScience have
developed and marketed new HT-GM seed packages
with stacked traits, combining glyphosate with either
dicamba or 2,4-D tolerance, respectively (Birkett
2020a, 2020b). Bayer and BASF have even teamed
up to introduce a triple-stack soybean line combining
resistance against glyphosate, glufosinate, and dicamba
(Bird 2020). In addition to this, nonglyphosate HT-
GM packages have been introduced that stack traits
resistant to other herbicides in soybeans and other
crops (Bayer: glufosinate and isoxaflutole; Syngenta:
dicamba and s-metolachlor; FMC: sulfentrazone and
pyroxasulfone; Birkett 2018; PMD 2020a). In 2020,
Bayer also announced early phase development of the
first new herbicide mode of action in thirty years tar-
geting grasses, precisely the weed class that has devel-
oped most resistance to glyphosate (Birkett 2020a),
and the promise of biopesticides also looms large. In
other words, institutional lock-in has meant that the
herbicide treadmill is powered by new combinations
more than new discoveries of either new chemicals or
alternatives to chemicals.
Although it might be tempting to see this as a ter-
minal crisis for agrochemicals, the dialectical dynamics
of this crisis, on the one hand, and the herbicide revo-
lution in the Global South and Eastern Europe, on
the other, suggest that these limits will also yield sur-
prises and opportunities for new forms of capital accu-
mulation in and through herbicide production
networks (Boyd, Prudham, and Schurman 2001;
Mansfield 2011; Guthman 2019). Indeed, there is sig-
nificant expansion and opportunity in the generic mar-
ket as second- and third-tier chemical producers
innovate at the level of process and formulation to
increase the number of herbicides on offer while main-
taining low price points. The second-tier Chinese firm
Jiangsu Yangnong (annual sales of $700 million), for
example, has recently added dicamba to its product
line to meet demand for stacked trait HT-GM crops
and alternatives to glyphosate for resistant weeds
(PMD 2020b). Although glyphosate accounts for 40
percent of U.S.-based Albaugh sales, the company,
with subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and
nearly half of its sales in Latin America, has boosted
production of 2,4-D and dicamba, and launched new
selective herbicide formulations (PMD 2019).
Chemical producers can also seek new markets, where
glyphosate resistance is not yet a major problem, and,
indeed, Latin American producers are doing so in
Central America (PMD 2019). In general, formulators
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of generic GBHs are in an advantageous position,
especially given that loss of patent protection for exist-
ing AIs coincides with the absence of new AI discov-
eries. In fact, Albaugh’s “new” position in 2,4-D is a
return to its roots, now with a global twist: The com-
pany’s first formulation plant in Ankeny, Iowa, was a
major producer of 2,4-D for the U.S. Midwest in
the 1980s.
Health and Safety
In addition to efficiency, safety was the other half
of the paired promise that permitted the pervasiveness
of glyphosate. Just as its very pervasiveness clearly
accelerated the development of weed resistance, recent
concerns over glyphosate safety to humans raise issues
about pervasive chemicals and emergences in humans
and nonplant organisms. The WHO’s reclassification
of glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans”
stands in sharp contrast to Monsanto’s long-standing
claims of low toxicity and environmental benignancy,
backed by regulatory agencies (International Agency
for Research on Cancer 2017). Following the WHO’s
assessment, both the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the European Food Safety
Authority made highly controversial moves, reaffirm-
ing their assessments that glyphosate is noncarcino-
genic (Cuhra, Bøhn, and Cuhra 2016; Myers et al.
2016; Benbrook 2019). In 2020—as we were writing
this article—the EPA again backed glyphosate, assert-
ing that there is no risk to human health and minimal
environmental risk (EPA 2020). The EPA’s latest
claims about the safety of glyphosate apparently dis-
count new evidence about the link between glypho-
sate and cancer, mainly non-Hodgkins lymphoma
(Zhang et al. 2019; Portier 2020), as well as between
glyphosate and noncancer outcomes; for example, in
the kidneys, liver, and gastrointestinal system (see
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
2019). New studies also are finding that glyphosate
acts epigenetically and as an endocrine disruptor to
produce long-term reproductive and developmental
effects (Duforestel et al. 2019; Kubsad et al. 2019;
Teleken et al. 2020). Notably, the U.S. EPA’s assess-
ment also contrasts with that of the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control, which confirms that there are both
cancer and noncancer risks to human health (Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 2019).
These conflicting findings are then fueling ongoing
legal actions in numerous jurisdictions over the
compound’s environmental and health risks. The first
successful lawsuit against Bayer/Monsanto over glypho-
sate exposure concluded in 2018, when a jury awarded
DeWayne Johnson a staggering $289 million (Gillam
2018). Since then, numerous individual and class
action suits have been filed against the company in
the United States and around the world (Houston
2019; Labin 2019; U.S. Right to Know n.d.).
Adding another layer of complication, glyphosate
has been presumed safe based on claims that it does
not persist in the environment but rapidly breaks
down to nonbiocidal compounds, even though not a
lot is known about the actual fate and persistence of
either glyphosate or its metabolites. Reflecting ways
in which knowledge is internal to the assemblage,
this knowledge gap exists in part because GBHs are
classified as nontoxic. That is, because GBHs are
considered safe, governmental agencies do not regu-
larly test agricultural land or food products for resi-
dues. Despite lack of systematic testing, studies have
discovered glyphosate’s remarkable pervasiveness in
soil, the human microbiome, food, and water
(Battaglin and Kolok 2014; Bai and Ogbourne 2016;
Cuhra, Bøhn, and Cuhra 2016; Myers et al. 2016;
Van Bruggen et al. 2018). In the 2000s, the U.S.
Geological Survey found low levels of glyphosate or
its principal metabolite (AMPA) in 58 percent of
nearly 4,000 soil and water samples from thirty-eight
states. The first global-scale model of environmental
hazard found glyphosate and AMPA to be low-level,
persistent contaminants in about 93 percent of crop-
lands, reaching middle to high hazard levels for
about 1 percent of global cropland (Maggi et al.
2020). Occasional food testing in the United States
and Canada has revealed widespread presence of
glyphosate and its principal metabolite (Bai and
Ogbourne 2016; Benbrook 2016). To date, however,
findings on residue levels have not led to prohibitive
regulatory actions. Instead, in 1999, 2012, and 2015,
the EPA increased tolerance levels (i.e., allowable
residues) in cereals and feed crops between 15 and
600 percent (Benbrook 2016).
Despite assurances of safety from the industry and
regulatory agencies, the 2015 WHO determination
of GBHs as probable carcinogens and the recent rul-
ings against Monsanto in legal cases have placed
glyphosate at the center of public concern over pesti-
cides, yielding a growing patchwork of regulations at
multiple scales. Examples include temporary suspen-
sion (e.g., the University of California system), bans
12 Werner, Berndt, and Mansfield
on urban use, bans on postemergent application (state
of Andhra Pradesh, India), suspensions of new GBH
registrations (Vietnam), and a ban on imports (Sri
Lanka). Uncertainty surrounding glyphosate’s license
in the EU also remains a key factor. Although the
number of multiscale regulatory actions against glyph-
osate is increasing, agrochemical firms, as we have
discussed, are not abandoning glyphosate but rather
are creating new formulations of existing active ingre-
dients including glyphosate for agricultural use. By
combining glyphosate with herbicides of high toxicity,
the priority of safety, already under considerable
strain, is sacrificed to the altar of efficiency.
Conclusion
The promise of a benign biocide appears to be too
good to be true. The unraveling of that promise, how-
ever, cannot be properly understood without recourse to
the wider set of social and natural relations that have
been articulated in and through glyphosate. We have
seen how the compound’s transition from a boutique,
high-priced weed solution to the world’s cheapest and
most ubiquitous herbicide was tied initially to the
expansion of no-till agricultural methods with the prom-
ise of better soil health and lower emissions. The intro-
duction of HT-GM seed packages furthered this
transformation in tandem with wider changes in agricul-
tural practices in the Global South as glyphosate offered
a readily accessible solution to rising rural labor costs.
As GBHs replaced diverse weed management tech-
niques, including multiple herbicides, the compound was
used ubiquitously across massive swaths of terrain.
Our argument has been that understanding these
dynamics in agriculture requires that we consider the
interactions among upstream chemical industries as
part of human–nature assemblages. By shifting our
lens to the generic herbicide industry, we have
detailed the rapid growth and restructuring of its
production network, which has met demand with
low-cost formulations. Centered in China, third-tier
firms marshaled glyphosate manufacturing into a net-
work entry strategy. Regulatory enforcement and
policies to promote product and process upgrading
led to a reorganization of firms and their relation-
ships, yielding considerable consolidation not only
among top-tier R&D firms but also among generic
AI producers and formulators, as some production
moved from China to India and elsewhere.
What are the implications of our arguments about
the glyphosate assemblage for how we think about
chemically driven industrial agriculture? Some see a
capitalist system of food production in crisis that has
finally passed a tipping point. For historical geogra-
pher Moore (2015), for instance, superweeds sound
the death knell for an agrifood system centered
around “cheap food.” Noting diminishing returns to
productivity with each modern innovation wave,
Moore argued that the cycles of capital intensification
in food production that facilitated soaring yields and
unprecedented declines in food prices in the twenti-
eth century have reached their limits in the twenty-
first century. The stubborn persistence of industry
insiders and protagonists who continue to espouse
modernist logics of repair and technical engineering
might be last gasps for a system in terminal crisis.
This is not our conclusion, however; our analysis of
the glyphosate assemblage suggests that claims like
these are premature at best. Global pesticide markets
and the vast majority of AI substance sales continue
to grow, not least because—as we have shown—weed
resistance provides new profit and accumulation
opportunities as older AI substances enjoy a come-
back in mixed herbicide formulations and stacked-
trait HT-GM seeds. As in Guthman’s (2019) analysis,
it is precisely these multiple entanglements under
conditions of chemical ubiquity that illustrate the
limits to modernist (re)framings of agrochemical-
intensive agriculture as either in terminal crisis or
capable of endless technological fixes. Instead of styl-
ized conclusions like these, we have conceptualized
glyphosate as a key element animating a wider socio-
technical assemblage that arranges specific agricultural
production methods and biotechnological knowledge.
From such an assemblage perspective, we focused on
contradictory disentanglements to better come to
terms with glyphosate’s chemical ubiquity and result-
ing uncertainties and anxieties. Doing so requires rec-
ognition that agrochemicals are commodities in their
own right (rather than just production inputs) and, as
such, are active agents that (re)arrange heterogeneous
elements in deeply contradictory ways, creating both
the material conditions for market success as well as
putting this success in danger.
Our interrogation of the glyphosate assemblage sug-
gests that a fruitful and underexplored dialogue is in
order across scholarship focused on the socionatures
of pesticides and other chemical geographies and on
the study of changing geographies of global
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production. If chemicals like glyphosate are ubiquitous,
the production of this ubiquity results from the
interaction between sociotechnical knowledge,
human–environment and more-than-human natures,
and the policies and plans of competitive capitals and
states. Glyphosate’s transformation from protected intel-
lectual property to a global market commodity has
coincided with the disruption of a long-standing pesti-
cide geography in which agrochemicals were largely
produced (and consumed) in the Global North and
exported to countries in the Global South. In the new
map of chemical ubiquity, middle-income countries are
also principal producers, exporters, and end markets in
a geography characterized by new south–south dynam-
ics. By linking chemical ubiquity to shifting firm
networks, our focus on the glyphosate assemblage high-
lights that marketization and commodification of glyph-
osate are deeply contradictory and always incomplete.
Although these production dynamics are formally out-
side institutions of repair such as weed science, learning
to think across these dimensions can aid in understand-
ing how the limits of repair will run their course. As
the regulatory landscape for glyphosate shifts and both
generic production and use expand rapidly in the
Global South, clearly a more global, transdisciplinary
approach can grasp the associated risks and opportuni-
ties across a highly dynamic geography of uneven
development.
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Notes
1. End-user prices varied considerably in different
countries. Averaged across major country markets,
Woodburn (2000) documented a decrease from
US$33.99/kg of technical glyphosate to US$22.12/kg
between 1991 and 1997
2. Although Monsanto’s precise installed capacity was
unavailable, Woodburn (2000) recorded that Monsanto
had an annual capacity to produce at least 140,000 tons
of the key intermediate phosphorous trichloride at its
Luling, Louisiana, facility in the mid-1990s.
3. China is a major producer of HT-GM cotton but the
only other GM crop the government has approved is
papaya (Foreign Agricultural Service Staff 2017).
4. Generic producers are normally defined as firms that
manufacture AIs or formulations that were
researched, developed, or first introduced by another
company and attribute the majority of their sales to
products that are off-patent.
5. A recent example is the AI metsulfuron-methyl. This
herbicide was sold by DuPont to FMC in 2017 in the
wake of DuPont’s merger with Dow, with FMC
quickly passing the substance on to the Indian
company Crystal in 2018. Metsulfuron is a selective
sulfonylurea herbicide introduced by DuPont in 1984
and mainly used for cereals, rice, and sugar-cane. It
was on the PAN list of highly hazardous pesticides
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